Working Paper

Where does the money come from to buy votes? We argue that an important source of funds for vote-buying comes from ‘contract clientelism’, or the provision of public contracts to private firms in exchange for campaign donations. Using quantitative...

• Contracts
• vote-buying
• Clientelism

Working Paper

• Contracts
• Land tenure
• Risk

Working Paper

This paper deals with loan contracting from a private bank in Vietnam. We focus on the main loan contract features that the bank uses in lending to business firms, namely loan maturity, collateral and loan interest rate. Based upon the simultaneous...

• Banking
• Business enterprises
• Contracts

Journal Article

Part of Journal Special Issue Sustainability of External Development Finance

• Contracts
• Economic assistance and foreign aid
• Political science

Working Paper

African populations need better support through social protection mechanisms. Among those who need social security are millions of older people who, having worked all their lives in the formal sector, are in precarious situations with lower benefits...

• Social security
• Pensions
• Contracts

Working Paper

It is often argued that an important reason why globalization may lead to GDP growth but fail to reduce poverty is because the poor are unable to participate in the new market opportunities and are marginalized. In this paper we examine the...

• Agriculture
• Commerce
• Contracts

Journal Article

Part of Journal Special Issue Poverty, Development, and Behavioral Economics

• Contracts
• Game theory

Working Paper

This paper evaluates aid both by considering the evidence on aid effectiveness in promoting growth and by considering how effective has aid been in exerting leverage on policy choices. We argue that in both respects aid has had beneficial effects. It...

• Contracts
• Economic assistance and foreign aid
• Economic development

Working Paper

This paper examines some of the issues associated with the aid donor process arising from the theory of agency or principal-agent models and endogenous policy determination. The principals may be viewed as legislators and the agents as the aid agency...

• Contracts
• Economic assistance and foreign aid
• Political science

Journal Article

Part of Journal Special Issue Development Aid

• Contracts
• Economic assistance and foreign aid

Working Paper

This paper analyses three issues in strategic donor-recipient interaction motivated by the complexity of the rationale underlying aid. The first is when we have several principals with conflicting objectives. Any one principal cannot offer high...

• Contracts
• Economic assistance and foreign aid

Journal Article

Part of Journal Special Issue Development Financing

• Contracts
• Economic assistance and foreign aid
• Economic development

Journal Article

Part of Journal Special Issue Aid Allocations and Development Financing

• Contracts
• Economic assistance and foreign aid
• Political science

Book Chapter

Part of Book Domestic Resource Mobilization and Financial Development

• Banking
• Business enterprises
• Contracts

Book Chapter

Part of Book Globalization and the Poor in Asia

• Agriculture
• Commerce
• Contracts

Journal Article

Part of Journal Special Issue Civil War in Developing Countries

• Conflict management
• Contracts
• Game theory