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Policy Brief
Improving the Basic Social Subsidy Programme for the elderly (PSSB) in Mozambique
The Basic Social Subsidy Programme (PSSB) is the largest publicly administered social assistance programme in Mozambique, covering more than 600,000 beneficiaries with an annual budget of approximately USD 50 million—equivalent to around 1% of total government expenditure in 2022.
Uneven coverage: the PSSB-Elderly programme shows regional disparities, with over-coverage in the South and under-coverage in poorer provinces like Zambézia and Nampula
Positive impacts: the programme improves food security and resilience to shocks immediately after transfers, but the effects diminish over time
Payment delays: delays in payments (averaging 8+ months in 2023) reduce the programme’s effectiveness and negatively affect beneficiaries’ well-being, including food security and mental health
Behavioural distortions: the programme’s payment structure encourages families to increase the number of declared household members, creating inefficiencies
The first version of the PSSB was established in 1990 to assist specific groups of people who are unable to support themselves—mainly the elderly, people with disabilities or chronic illnesses, and orphaned children. Currently, the largest component of the programme is PSSB-Elderly (PSSB-Idoso), which focuses on individuals aged 60 and over living in poverty. Under the scheme, which operates as a non-contributory pension, beneficiaries should receive an average payment of around 500 MZN (USD 7.9) per month. In reality, however, even under normal operating conditions payments are often bunched together in 3 to 4 lump-sum payments per year.
According to estimates, the PSSB-Elderly serves up to two-thirds of the country’s poor elderly. The inclusion of a large number of beneficiaries reflects the government’s commitment to social protection. However, a recent assessment carried out by the Inclusive growth in Mozambique (IGM) programme identified challenges in its implementation with important implications for its impact.
This brief summarizes the key findings of the IGM study measuring the efficiency and effectiveness of the PSSB and suggests policy recommendations.
Evaluating the effectiveness of the PSSB: Vulnerable Lives Survey (VLS)
Evidence on the effectiveness and impacts of the PSSB-Elderly is scarce. To fill this gap, the IGM programme carried out a series of analyses using secondary and primary data, beginning in 2024. Secondary data included the administrative registry of beneficiaries (e-INAS), data from the 2017 Census, and data from the Household Budget Surveys (IOF 2020 and 2022).
In addition, the Vulnerable Lives Survey (VLS) collected critical data about programme beneficiaries and comparable individuals in the same communities. The first round of VLS, conducted between May and August 2024, included a sample of 2,400 households in the provinces of Nampula, Zambézia, Sofala, and Maputo. The total sample consisted of 1,000 PSSB-elderly beneficiaries and 1,400 non-beneficiaries (comparison group).
Programme coverage is uneven
There are significant regional disparities in PSSB-Elderly’s coverage. There is evidence of over-coverage in the South, while in poorer and more populous provinces—such as Zambézia and Nampula—many people who are likely to qualify are left out (under-coverage). Figure 1 shows the upper limit of the percentage of people theoretically eligible for PSSB-Elderly (being over 60 years old and poor) who are also covered. In Gaza, it is noted that 73% of poor elderly people are programme beneficiaries, while in Nampula only 39% are served.
The administrative database (e-INAS) presents inconsistencies: it is estimated that around 11% of registered beneficiaries have already died. Furthermore, there is outdated information on age and family composition, which may compromise the efficiency of resource distribution.
Source | Evaluating the Impact of the Basic Social Subsidy Programme on Elderly Well-Being in Mozambique, IGM 2024.
PSSB-Elderly has positive effects on well-being
The data indicate that the PSSB-Elderly cash transfer can contribute to improving the well-being of beneficiaries. Food consumption by beneficiary households increases substantially soon after receiving the subsidy. In the first three months after the transfer, beneficiaries spend, on average, twice as much on food compared to similar non-beneficiaries. However, these positive effects are not maintained over time. Six months after the last transfer, food consumption between beneficiaries and comparison groups is not too different.
Also, beneficiaries have greater rates of resilience to negative economic shocks immediately after receiving transfers. This suggests that when regular and consistent, payments can be an important buffer against external shocks.
Payment delays compromise the effectiveness of the programme
In 2023, PSSB payments became increasingly irregular, with average delays of more than eight months. This reduced the expected benefits of the programme. In some cases, delayed payments compromised the well-being of beneficiaries. VLS data show that the food security of beneficiaries in 2024 was worse than that of comparable non-beneficiaries, worsening over time since the last payment. The mental health index of beneficiaries also worsened with payment delays. Concretely, the positive effect on mental health of a recent transfer (by 0.17 standard deviations) is negated after nine months without receiving another transfer.
Re-establish regular payments: it is important to prioritize the regular timely payments to beneficiaries, which in turn requires secure funding streams
Improve equity in coverage: over time, the programme will need to be expanded into underserved provinces, such as Zambézia and Nampula, to address regional inequalities
Strengthen and simplify the management and operation of the programme: set benefit levels to a fixed amount per individual subsidy, indexed to the cost of living. Likewise, implement a more transparent and predictable registration process, eliminating waiting lists
Improve the database and monitoring: in the long term, create a single national registry of beneficiaries of social programmes to allow for better coordination and selection of beneficiaries
Anticipation effects distort incentives
As the PSSB-Elderly is a well-known and important programme for vulnerable older adults, the expectation of entering the programme can influence household behaviour. Specifically, when compared to current beneficiaries, we find people on the ‘waiting list’ for PSSB have larger families as well as higher monthly incomes. In part, this reflects the structure of payments—beneficiaries living with a larger number of dependents receive a larger subsidy, thus creating incentives to establish more people in the household around the time of formal enrolment.
